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whose restricted province is an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, and the legal
form of the court's proceedings. Hamilton v. Harwood, 113 Ill. 154 (1885); People v.
Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899); White v. Wagar, 185 Ill. 195, 57 N.E. 26
(I9oo); Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Il. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (195o); Carroll v. Hottston, 341 Ill.
531, 173 N.E. 657 (193o); Crocker v. Abel, 348 111. 269, 18o N.E. 852 (1932); Ellfeldt v.
Chicago, 189 II. App. 61o (1914); People ex rel. Aeberly v. Chicago, 240 InI. App. 208
(1926).

Even conceding that the court felt the need for a more efficacious writ, the order of
the Medical Committee might well have been affirmed. The record contained specific
findings of facts made by a group of medical practitioners. If these facts were sufficient
to justify the finding of gross malpractice by applying the lowest conceivable standard
to the medical profession, then the conclusion should have been upheld and the application of the erroneous standard considered as harmless error. Though an improper
finding of law may be made, if the findings of fact are in accordance with the proper
construction of the law, then the specific finding of law which is erroneous is mere surplusage.
WALTER W. BAKER

Conflict of Laws-Extraterritorial Effect of Custody Decree-[Mvfinnesota].-The
plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Iowa, the court awarding custody of an infant
child alternately to each parent for six months of the year, and providing, for a readjudication of the question of custody in three years. The plaintiff later became domiciled in Minnesota. At the end of one of the six-month periods, plaintiff surrendered
custody of the child to the defendant; but before defendant could return to Iowa, the
plaintiff sued out a writ of habeas corpus challenging his right to the child's custody.
The lower court awarded custody of the child to the plaintiff until further order, and
the defendant appealed, principally on the ground that the Minnesota court lacked
jurisdiction to make a decree affecting the child's custody. Held, the child was domiciled in Minnesota and the MIinnesota court had jurisdiction to determine the child's
custody, not being bound by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
to give effect to the Iowa decree. State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 252 N.W. 329 (Minn.
1934).

Since a decree of custody of a child is an adjudication of a domestic status and alters
substantially the relationship of parent and child, only the state of the child's domicile
should have jurisdiction to award such a decree. People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence. 27
P. (2d) 1038 (Colo. 1933); Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, i15 S.E. i15 (1922);
W~eber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, x63 N.E. 269 (1928); It re Volk, 254 lich. 25, 235
N.W. 854 (i93i); Sanders v. Sanders, 224 Mo. App. 1107, 14 S.W. (2d) 458 (193i); It
re Erving, xo 9 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 AUt. 16x (193'); Griffin v. Griffit, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac.
598 (1920); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1st ed. 1927), § 13i; Beale, The Status of The
Child and the Conflict of Laws, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 21 (1933); Beale, The Progress

of the Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 5o, 57 (1920); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits, 7 Corn. L. Quar. i (1921). Cf. Minick v. Minick, i49 So. 483 (Fla. 1933).
If a court decreeing custody of a child to one parent has adequate jurisdiction, the
preponderance of authority holds that the decree is resjudicataas to all matters prior
to the time of its rendition, and the right of the parent to custody of the child will be
recognized in another state. Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238 (1872); State ex rel. Nipp v.
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128 Pac. 590 (1912); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289
Pac. 740 (I93o ); it Re Penner, 161 Vash. 479, 297 Pac. 757 (I931r); Groves v. Barto, 1o9
Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919). But it is generally held that such a decree has no controlling effect in another state as to facts arising subsequent to the date of the decree.
People ex rel. Stockhant v. Schaedel, 340 Ill. 56o, 173 N.E. 172 (1930); In re Lell, 240
Mich. 240, 215 N.W. 384 (1927); Myliufs v. Cargill, xg N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (1914);
Gaunt v. Gaunt, 16o Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d) 579 (1932); 2o A.L.R. 815 (1922); Beale, The
Status of The Child and the Conflict of Laws, x Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 24 (1933); 26
Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1928). The ease with which a court may find "changed circumstances" has tended to reduce the importance of a foreign custody decree, although the
burden is put upon the person seeking to disturb the status quo to show that new circumstances have arisen. Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. r (191o); Turner v.
Turner, 169 Atl. 873 (N.H. 1934); Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (I914).
A few courts, however, refuse to give any recognition to foreign custody decrees, on
the ground that it is to the best interests of the child to have the entire matter re-litigated by the court of the forum. In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (188i); Avery v. Avery, 33
Kan. , 5 Pac. 418 (1885); In re Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (i9i1); Friendly
v. Friendly, 137 Ore. 18o, 2 P. (2d) 1 (1931); 2o A.L.R. 817. These cases are distinctly
in the minority. Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Corn. L. Quar. i
(1921); 27 Mich. L. Rev. 339 (1929); 13 Minn. L. Rev. 261 (1929).
A more difficult problem arises when custody of a childis awarded to one parent, subject to further order of court; and, subsequently, after parent and child have become
domiciled in another state, the decree is modified. Most courts hold that when the
person to whom the custody was given becomes domiciled in another state, the jurisdiction of the first State is ended, and the second state alone may affect the child's
custody, since the child's domicile changes with that of the parent in whose custody he
has been placed. People ex rd. Wagner v. Torrenee, 27 P. (2d) io38 (Colo. 1933); In re
Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (igxi); Gaunt v. Gaunt, i6o Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d)
579 (1932); Grifl v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920); Barnes v..Lee, 128 Ore. 655,
275 Pac. 661 (1929); Groves v. Barto, 1o9 Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919); Beale, The
Status of The Child and the Conflict of Laws, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 22 (1933). The
present case aligns itself with this group.
On the other hand, a number of courts take the view that the first court retains jurisdiction of questions as to the custody of the child, in spite of the removal of the child
and the custodian parent from the state. Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238 (1872); In re
Krautkoff, igi Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112 (1915); State ex rel. Nipp v. Dist. Ct., 46
Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 590 (1912); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7
Corn. L. Quar. 1 (1921). See Stetson v. Stetson, So Me. 483, 15 Atl. 6o (1888). If the
child and both parents leave the state in which the custody decree was granted, it seems
possible that all courts might agree that the jurisdiction of the first state has terminated.
There is much to be said for the minority view that the first state retains control of
questions of custody. The welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration
in the award of custody, and the determination of the child's domicile, which is only a
means to that further end, should be governed thereby. In the majority of cases it
would seem that the state in which the divorce is secured is best fitted to provide for the
child's future welfare. In the present case the Iowa court had granted perhaps the
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most equitable of custody decrees; care of the child was awarded to each parent, alternately, for equal periods of time, and provision was made for modification in the
future. Yet the majority view, and the present case, permit a custodian to evade that
type of decree by removing the child to another jurisdiction.
Since cases like the present one do represent the modem view, however, perhaps the
only solution is to have the court awarding custody place strong economic pressure
upon the custodian of the child to secure obedience to modifications of the original decree. It will do little good for the first court to threaten the custodian with punishment
for contempt if the child is removed from the court's jurisdiction, since full faith and
credit will not be given to modifications of the custody decree while parent and child
are outside the state. People ex re. Wagner v. Torrence, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (Colo. 1933).
But the first state might require a bond conditioned upon full obedience to future orders
of the court as a condition precedent to securing custody of the child. Mattox v. Mattox,
129 Okla. 301, 264 Pac. 898 (1928).
NATHAN WOLF3ERG

Corporate Reorganization-Premature Receivership-"Upset Price" Doctrine
-[Federal].-The current financial position of the National Radiator Corporation,
judged by the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities, was excellent; however, the
corporation had sustained heavy operating losses in each year since its organization
in 1927, and the officers and directors believed that some readjustment of the capital
structure, consisting in the main of a large issue of debentures, was necessary to
escape ultimate insolvency. A plan of reorganization involving an exchange of securities was proposed, and eventually accepted by ninety-five per cent of the debenture
holders. Pursuant to the plan, interest payments on the debentures were defaulted.
Thereupon certain dissenting debenture holders sued to collect the interest past due;
to frustrate their action and effectuate the reorganization, a suit in the nature of a
creditor's bill was brought by the bondholders' committee, the prior suit enjoined, and
a receiver appointed. The court set an upset price about ten per cent in excess of the
liquid assets of the corporation, relying entirely on figures compiled by the bondholders' committee, a nominee of which became the purchaser at the receiver's sale
at a sum slightly above the upset price. At the hearing on confirmation of the sale, two
groups of creditors objected, the first on the theory that the court lacked equity jurisdiction of the suit, and the second on the ground that the sale price was inadequate.
Held, the first group was entitled to payment of its claims in full because the receivership and sale was fraudulent in law, since it had hindered and delayed the collection
of these claims while the corporation was solvent; and the second group was entitled
to that sum in cash which they would have received if the property had been sold at
a proper price. First NationalBank v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 54 Sup. Ct. 298 (1934),
rehearing denied Feb. 5,1934.
Since the sanction given the friendly receivership in Re Metropolitan Railway
Receivership, 2o8 U.S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219, 52 L. Ed. 403 (igo8), the Supreme Court
has shown a gradual though decided reversal of feeling toward this device to accomplish corporate readjustment. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268,
Margolies,279 U.S.
72 L. Ed. 457 (1928), noted in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 804 (1928); Riehle v.
218, 49 Sup. Ct. 310, 73 L. Ed. 669 (1929), Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 53 Sup.
Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed. 355 (1932), noted in 81 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 642 (i933); cf. May Ho-

